John Carroll University

Carroll Collected
Theology & Religious Studies

7-1-1987

Is "Narrative" Really a Panacea? The Use of
"Narrative" in the Work of Metz and Hauerwas
Paul Lauritzen
John Carroll University, plauritzen@jcu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://collected.jcu.edu/theo_rels-facpub
Part of the Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Lauritzen, Paul, "Is "Narrative" Really a Panacea? The Use of "Narrative" in the Work of Metz and Hauerwas" (1987). Theology &
Religious Studies. 47.
http://collected.jcu.edu/theo_rels-facpub/47

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carroll Collected. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theology & Religious Studies by an
authorized administrator of Carroll Collected. For more information, please contact connell@jcu.edu.

Is "Narrative"Really a Panacea?
The Use of "Narrative"in the Work
of Metz and Hauerwas*
Paul Lauritzen/

John CarrollUniversity

The category of narrative or story has received much attention in
recent discussions of Christian theology and ethics. Indeed, the theme
of narrative is so popular today that a virtual cottage industry of academic scholarship has grown up around the discussion of this theme.'
This essay adds to the growing literature on the topic of narrative, but
my intention is not to contribute to the substantive debate on this topic.
Rather, this paper raises a more preliminary question: why has the
notion of narrative suddenly become so much discussed as a category of
theological and ethical reflection? The answer, I suggest, is that the
category of narrative appears to be almost a panacea for the ills
afflicting contemporary theology and ethics. In particular, the category
of narrative appears to address problems arising from the tenuous cognitive status of Christianity in the modern world. One of the major
objectives of this paper, then, will be to see how, and to what specific
ills, narrative is a putative remedy.
To accomplish this objective, I will rehearse one account of the problems besetting contemporary Christian thought, that set out by Jeffrey
Stout in his book, Flightfrom Authority.2Stout's presentation of the contemporary problematic is very helpful in explaining the predilection for
narrative in current discussions. Briefly summarized, what Stout
argues is that, as a result of the breakdown of the traditional category of
* I would like to thank
John P. Reeder, Jr., and the two anonymous readers for TheJournalof
Religionwhose suggestions were both extremely helpful and much appreciated.
1 For a review of some of the
growing literature on the topic of narrative, see George Stroup,
"A Bibliographical Critique," TheologyToday32, no. 2 (July 1975): 133-43, as well as Stroup's
The Promiseof NarrativeTheology(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981). See also the October 1983
thematic issue of Interpretation,
vol. 37, no. 4.
2
Jeffrey Stout, Flightfrom Authority(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981).
o 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/87/6703-0004$01.00
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authority, and with the introduction of the modern conception of
probability, Christian believers were, and are, faced with the following
dilemma: either they reformulate their beliefs in a way that is compatible with modernity - in which case the beliefs inevitably lose their distinctiveness -or they positively celebrate the paradoxical nature of the
beliefs-in which case the beliefs remain incomprehensible and hence
socially irrelevant in the modern world. I suggest that the prevalence of
the category of narrative, in recent Christian ethics in particular, may
be accounted for by the fact that it seems to be almost perfectly suited
to negotiate the dilemma set out by Stout.
To lend force to this suggestion I will examine the place of narrative
in the work of two contemporary Christian ethicists, Johannes Metz
and Stanley Hauerwas. Although these writers represent different religious traditions, both rely in significant ways on the category of narrative in their work. What I hope to show is that, in both cases, the
appeal to narrative is intended to resolve the sorts of difficulties introduced by Stout: both Metz and Hauerwas are concerned to revitalize
Christian faith, both want to make it once again socially relevant, and
both are adamant that it retain its distinctiveness. That both should
also place such a heavy emphasis on the concept of narrative I will
argue is not coincidental.
This paper, then, will examine the use of the category of narrative in
the work of Metz and Hauerwas. The burden of the paper will be to
show both that Metz and Hauerwas share a vision of narrative and of
its place in addressing the problems raised by Stout and that Metz and
Hauerwas decidedly do not share a vision of the specific normative
implications of the Christian narrative(s). The agreement between
Metz and Hauerwas highlights the attractiveness of the category of
narrative in confronting long-standing problems in theology and
ethics, while their disagreement underscores some of the new problems
that the use of narrative raises for theology and ethics.
The paper itself is divided into essentially four parts. The first part
sets the stage for a discussion of the place of narrative in the work of
Metz and Hauerwas by reviewing the account Stout gives of what he
calls the "dialectical situation of contemporary theism." Metz and
Hauerwas are then taken up in turn, and an attempt is made to show
that, despite the differences in terminology and emphasis, both are
wrestling with essentially the same problems and that both rely on narrative as a crucial problem-solving tool. The fourth section notes some
of the direct correlations between the work of Metz and Hauerwas and
in conclusion identifies some of the problems both must face if they are
to make narrative a viable category of Christian ethics.
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THE DIALECTICAL SITUATION OF CONTEMPORARY THEISM

There are many different stories that could be told of the history of
Christian thought in the modern world. One of the merits of that
recounted by Jeffrey Stout in his book, Flightfrom Authority,is that it
helps uncover the reasons for the current appeal of the concept of narrative. According to Stout, our current problems have their roots most
deeply in the soil of seventeenth-centurythought and, in particular, in
the emergence of a decidedly modern conception of probability. The
significance of this development is found in the departure it represents
from the previous conception of probability. Prior to the introduction
of statistical and evidential criteria for assessing a proposition'struth,
probability essentially consisted of approval by authority, whether in
the form of an appeal to the right persons or to the right books. And
this meant that even the most paradoxical beliefs were considered
highly probable so long as they had the right imprimatur. Thus, the
introduction of the new probability changed the religious situation
drastically. For with this introduction, the connection between probability and authority was broken. And this in turn meant that the religious believer was left with the unenviable task of attempting to supply
new reasons for believing that the central claims of theism, claims that
no longer seemed inherently probable, were indeed more probable
than not. As the title of Stout's book intimates, it is this flight from
authority and to the new probability that is both characteristic of
modernity and determinativeof the Church'sprecariousposition in the
modern world.
With this flight from authority, Stout suggests, Christian believers
are confronted with an uncomfortable choice: either they attempt to
revise their beliefs in an effort to meet the new criteria of truthfulness,
or they cling to traditional beliefs, however improbable these beliefs
may appear. Unfortunately, says Stout, both options have deleterious
consequences. To choose the first course, that of revision, requires
abandoning or recasting any beliefs too paradoxical to be made probable. The problem with this response to modernity is that the more one
abandons or recasts, the less like traditional theism the revised faith
becomes. Alternatively, not to revise would appear to consign theism to
the margins of public life, for an unreconstructed theism will appear
too improbable to be taken seriously by modern culture. Hence, in the
modern world, Christianity is faced with the problem of how to escape
this dilemma: indistinctness or irrelevance. To attempt to revise the
faith threatens to make it indistinctive; not to revise the faith threatens
to make it irrelevant.
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Now Stout is very good indeed at showing the way in which the
movement of Christian thought from Deism to neoorthodoxy seems
trapped in dialectical tension between these two poles. Although I
cannot reproduce Stout's account in any detail, it is worth looking
briefly at his depiction of several moments of this dialectic. The first
centers around the figure of Kant.
According to Stout, Kant's writings are impaled on one horn of the
dilemma that menaces every modern attempt to defend Christian faith,
that of irrelevance. Because Kant recognized the seriousnessof Hume's
challenge to the Deist attempt to make theism probable, Kant sought to
avoid probabilistic arguments for theism. By doing so he avoided the
danger to which Deism succumbed, namely, the other horn of the
dilemma-lack of distinctiveness. Still, he could not make religious
faith socially relevant. Kant could not maintain the relevance of Christian faith, says Stout, because he pursued a strategy of separation: by
declaring religion to be an improper matter for theoreticalspeculation,
Kant created a formidablewall between Christian belief and the intellectual life of the culture. It was a wall, says Stout, that insured that
religious life would be an essentially private rather than public affair.
The second figure whose work illustrates the dangers facing any
attempt to find a place for theism in the modernworld is Hegel. According to Stout, nothing better illustrates the dialectical situation of contemporary theism than the situation of Hegel and his followers. In
Stout'sview, Hegel saw clearly the problems involved in the strategy of
separation pursued by Kant (and Schleiermacher), and thus Hegel
argued that "onlyby restoring to Christian theism its cognitive dimension and by taking seriously precisely those paradoxicaldoctrines that
make it seem distinctive to secular thought could it retain a role of any
centrality in modern culture."3Whereas the Deists had jettisoned the
hard paradoxes of Christian faith as improbable, and while Kant had
softened them with reductive interpretations, "Hegel was prepared to
treat them as the essential truths of religious consciousness. Religious
consciousness attempts to say in symbols and stories what ordinary
consciousness cannot say in more direct fashion."4 Hegel's system,
then, was an attempt to provide an interpretationof the hard paradoxes
that made them both comprehensible and a matter of public faith.
Thus, Hegel, perhaps better than anyone else, understood the
dilemma confronting modern theism and he resolutely sought to
address it.
3 Ibid., p. 139.
4 Ibid., p. 136.

325

The Journal of Religion
But, says Stout, if we findin Hegel'sworkthe clearestrecognitionof
the difficultiesfacingtheismin the modernworld,we havein the fateof
Hegelianisma dramaticillustrationof the nearimpossibilityof successfully negotiatingthese difficulties,even when they are recognized.
Indeed, Stoutthinksthat it is impossible."Hegel,it would seem, had
attemptedthe impossible.Neitherphilosophicalthoughtnor practical
activity could be both completelysecular and completelyreligious.
andthoroughlyintegrated."5
Religioncouldnot be bothdistinguishable
Moreover,the workof Hegel'ssuccessorsatteststo this fact. For no
one seemedcapableof steeringthe middlecourseHegel had sought.
And, once off course, therewere only two options:shipwreckon the
rocksof irrelevance(e.g., Kierkegaard)or shipwreckon the rocksof
indistinctiveness(e.g., Feurbach and Marx). This is why Stout
endorsesKarl L6with'sclaim that Marx and Kierkegaard"posethe
'exclusive'choicesof post-HegelianChristianity."6
This, then, is Stout'ssketchof the dialecticalsituationof contemporarytheism.Whatwe mustconsiderat thispointis the possibilitythat
the conceptof narrativeoffersan alternativeto thesetwobleakchoices.
ForwhatI want to suggestin the next two sectionsof this paperis that
it is preciselythe apparentabilityof the conceptof narrativeto resolve
Stout'sdilemmathatmakesit suchan attractivecategoryof contemporary Christianthought.In other words, an appealto the categoryof
narrativewouldseemto maintainboththe distinctivenessand the relevance of Christianfaith.
NARRATIVE IN THE WORK OF JOHANNES METZ

We can begin to trackthe connectionbetweenStout'sproblematicand
the use of the categoryof narrativein recent Christianthoughtby
focusingon the work of JohannesMetz. In both Faithin Historyand
8 Metz appealsto
and in an earlierwork,A Theology
Society7
oftheWorld,
narrativeas one of the centralcategoriesof Christianthought.Thus,
an examinationof these two worksis helpfulfor understandingthe
placeof narrativein Metz'sthought.As we will see, for Metz narrative
servesto resolveproblemsvery much like those raisedby Stout.
Now it may at first appearmisguided,if not simply confused,to
attemptto finda placeforMetz in whatis essentiallyan accountof the
historyof Protestantthoughtin the modernworld.Yet, if we turn to
Metz'swork,we findMetzhimselfdescribingthe contextof his thought
5 Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid.
7
Johannes Metz, Faith in Historyand Society(New York: Seabury Press, 1980).
8 Johannes Metz, A Theologyof the World(New York: Herder & Herder, 1969).

6
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in a way that echoes Stout's discussion. Consider, for example, the following list of subheadings to a chapter designed to set the stage for his
own constructive position: "The Crisis of Tradition," "The Crisis of
Authority," "The Crisis of (Metaphysical) Reason," and, finally,
"Religion in a State of Crisis." Moreover, when we turn to the sections
themselves, we discover that there is more than surface resemblance
here; the crises are genuinely similar. Metz argues, for example, that
one of the results of the Enlightenment-from which all these crises
spring-was the breakdownof the unity between religion and society, a
breakdown that put Christian theologians in the novel position of having to make a case for the relevance of the Christian faith. In fact, says
Metz, endorsing a view set out by Peter Berger, as the split between
religion and society grew wider, the churches were faced with two
options.
As sociallyplausiblestructuresof Christianity,the churchescan eithertry to
adaptthemselvesto the definitionsof realitymadeby the surroundingworld
or strengthentheir own positionsas cognitiveminoritieswith regardto the
worldaroundthem. Thereare, however,considerabledifficultiesinvolvedin
boththesealternativesforthe innerstructureof Christianity.The firstalternative threatensthe spiritualcontentof Christianity.... The secondalternative
is in collisionwith the Christianchurches'understandingof themselvesthat
has existedsince the time of Constantineas institutionsthat are involvedin
manydifferentwayswith societyas a whole.9
Now these two options are essentially those identified by Stout, and
Metz seems to imply that the consequences of adopting either option
are those highlighted by Stout as well: irrelevanceor lack of distinctiveness. Metz goes on to point out, for example, that the history of Catholic thought during this period is not without representativesof both of
these strategies. On the one hand, says Metz, there is the response of
neoscholasticism, which effectively created a "neoscholasticghetto," in
which the Church attemptedto remain isolated from contemporaryhistorical and philosophical concerns. The unfortunate consequence of
this response to the challengeof the Enlightenmentwas social obscurity.
On the other hand, when, in the form of the "newtheology,"the Church
attempted to adopt itself to "the definitions of reality made by the surrounding world," the result was what Metz calls the privatization of
theology. According to Metz, with the efforts of theologians such as
Karl Rahner to accommodate "theautonomy of reason and the world,"
the practice of faith was reduced to a "timeless decision" of the
autonomous individual. Unfortunately, says Metz, on this view, religion ceases to be crucial in the social construction of the person and
9 Metz, Faith in History and Society, p. 155.
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comes, rather, to be understood as a boutonniere, so to speak, chosen
by the autonomous and solitary individual who is already nearly fully
dressed.
Now if we step back from Metz's characterization of these two
responses to the challenge posed by the Enlightenment, we can see that
Metz has posed essentially the same dilemma as Stout: erosion of the
content of faith (lack of distinctiveness) or social obscurity (irrelevance). What is interesting here is that Metz clearly sees himself as trying to find a via media between these two unacceptable options. Moreover, it is clear that Metz sees this middle way as paved by the concept
of narrative. For Metz, appeal to the concept of narrative allows us to
take seriously the cognitive challenge modernity poses to Christian
faith without making Christianity either irrelevant or indistinctive. To
see how narrative functions in this way we must turn to Metz's discussion of the concept of narrative.
Unfortunately, Metz does not provide a systematic account of what
he means by narrative, the narrative structureof theology, or a narrating faith. Still, we can begin to see what Metz means by narrative by
noting that on one level, when he talks about the need for a narrative
form of theology, he means to do nothing more than to highlight the
storytelling character of the Christian community. We must remember, he writes, that Christianity "has, from the very beginning, not
been primarily a community interpretingand arguing, but a community remembering and narrating with a practical intention."10And it
should be noted that both of these elements are central to his understanding of narrative. Both the opposition of narrativeto reasoning and
argumentation and the connection between narrative and practical
action are crucial.11
Moreover, both of these points are connected to problems raised for
the Church by the phenomenon of secularization. For example, Metz's
preference for storytelling to argument seems to be born of the conviction that Christian faith can only be made intelligible to the modern
world if it is presented in a nontheoreticalway. This is why he says that
we must learn to recognize the fact that stories of conversion, exodus,
and the like are not simply "dramaticembellishments of a previously
conceived 'pure' theology"l2but rather form the "basic structure"of
theology. Unfortunately, this is not something that liberal theologians
have realized, and the result has been an attempt to adjust the theoret10 Ibid., p. 212.
11 "Opposition"is probably too strong here, for Metz does say that every story involves reasoning and argument. The point, however, is that there is a very large difference in perspective
between these two foci of theological thought.
12
Metz, Faith in Historyand Society,p. 51.
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ical content of faith in a way that makesit more acceptableto contemporarybelievers.In fact, we have alreadyseen one consequenceof
this failureto appreciatethe unavoidablynarrativestructureof theology, namely, the new theology'semphasison the momentof private
decision.But, accordingto Metz, this sort of "existentialist
theology"
cannotbut fail because"apurelyargumentativetheologywhich concealsits originsand does not makethispresentagainand againin narrativememoryinevitablyleads... [to] the extinctionof the identifiable
contentof Christiansalvation."13
We need to breakthe "spell"of the
idea of a total reconstruction
of the faithbasedon abstractreasonand
to realizethat christologicalknowledge"isnot handeddownprimarily
as a concept"but in the stories about Christ.14Our consciousness,
Metz argues,is inextricably"entwined"
in stories,andthusouridentity
is alwaysformedby "narrativeidentification."
This is why the emphasison narrative,forMetz, is so closelytied to
the notion of practicalactionand why he arguesthat the pictureof a
solitaryand autonomousindividualassentingto the rationallyreconstructedpropositionsof faithis so misleading.In bothcases,the reason
is thatthe storiesthatshapethe individualmustbe thoughtof as defining the veryidentityof the subjectandcannotbe conceivedas a "superstructure"that gets added"ontoan alreadyformedidentityof the subject."15Thus, ideally,the Christianstory"entersdeeplyinto the basis
of existence"and hence leads directlyto action. Further,since the
stories themselvesare essentiallypractical(i.e., stories about God
acting for people), it is even possibleto talk about the "primacyof
praxis"in Christiantheology. But the importantpoint is this: only
when we acknowledgethat the structureof human consciousnessis
necessarilynarrativewill we recover the view that religion is the
expressionof a primaryneed. Only then will we abandonthe notion
thatwe mustfirstargueand reasonaboutreligiousconceptsbeforeasking about religiouspractice.
At thispointwe can perhapsbestget clearabouthow, forMetz, narrativefunctionsto resolvesome of the difficultiesfacingcontemporary
Christianthoughtby steppingback and characterizingMetz'suse of
thiscategoryin termsof Stout'saccount.If we do this, I thinkit is possibleto arguethatMetz'spositionis in somewaysa variationof Kant's.
LikeKant, Metz arguesthatthe truthfulnessof Christianitycannotbe
demonstratedin a purelyspeculativeway. LikeKant, he believesthat
we must approachthe faith throughpracticalreason. Unlike Kant,
13 Ibid., p. 213.
14
15

Ibid., p. 52.
Ibid., p. 62.
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however,he does not believethat the storiesof the Christianfaithare
merelymoral allegoriesto be discardedwith the arrivalof a purely
rationalfaith.Paradoxically,KanthadmadeChristianityirrelevantby
substitutingthe question,What oughtI to do? for the question,What
can I know?Unfortunately,becausefor Kant the answerto the first
questioncan be discoveredwithoutrecourseto Christianfaith, Christianitybecameirrelevant.Metz, by contrast,does not substitutequestionsof practicalreasonforquestionsof theoreticalreason,but he does
suggestthat theoreticalquestionsaboutwhat I can know are directly
relatedto questionsof practicalreason.Moreover,accordingto Metz,
the narrativestructureof humanconsciousnessandthe narrativestructureof biblicalfaithinsurethathumanpraxiscannotbe determinedby
Kant'spurelyrationalfaith. Human praxisis itselfstorybound.
The categoryof narrativethus helps to overcomethe difficultiesin
Kant'saccountbecause it allows Metz to talk about the connection
betweenreligionand practicalreasonwithoutreducingthe one to the
other. On the contrary,if thereis any reductionhere, it is of practical
reasonto narrative.For, as Metz makesclear,it is the storythatconditions moralaction,not the need forpracticalactionthatconditionsthe
story. Moreover, Metz's emphasison narrativealso allows him to
secondHegel'sendorsementof the necessarilycommunalnatureof the
Christianreligion, withoutforcinghim to supportthis commitment
with an elaboratemetaphysicalschemain whichthe storiesare shown
to havea place.Takensimplyas storiesthatstillhavelife-transforming
potential,the biblicalnarrativesare intelligible,relevant,and distinctive. They are intelligiblebecausethey continueto have the powerto
shapeand directlives. They are relevantbecausesuchstoriesare intimately connectedto practicalsocial action, and they are distinctive
becausethey are notjust any old stories,but storiesaboutthe ChristianGodthatcannotbe reducedto anyuniversalhumanmessagewithout loss of content.
NARRATIVE IN THE WORK OF STANLEY HAUERWAS

If we turnnow to the workof StanleyHauerwas,we will see that the
categoryof narrativefunctionsforHauerwasmuchas it doesforMetz.
That is, for Hauerwas,as for Metz, narrativeis an attractivetheological category,for it pointsto a way aroundthe dilemmahighlightedby
Stout.
The firstthingthat shouldbe notedaboutHauerwas'sdiscussionof

narrative is that, in contrast to Metz's treatment, it is systematically

developedin responseto what is identifiedas a mistaken(Enlighten330
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ment) view of moral objectivity. Indeed, Hauerwas tells us that he
focuses on the related categories of narrative and character as a way of
developing an account of moral experience that does not suffer from the
distorting effects of what he calls the "standard account" of moral
rationality. Since narrative is to serve in this corrective role, we can
begin by identifying the problematic features of this standard account.
According to Hauerwas, there are at least three essential ways in which
the standard account distorts the nature of our moral experience: it (1)
places "unwarranted emphasis" on individual decisions in "quandary"
situations, (2) fails to account for the importance of moral notions other
than principles and rules, and (3) alienates the moral agent from his or
her interests and passions.
Now as anyone who is at all familiar with his work knows, Hauerwas
lays the blame for these distortions largely on Kant and, in particular,
on Kant's view of moral objectivity as involving a quest for universality. As Hauerwas sees it, modern moral theory has been engaged in
a futile attempt, initiated by Kant, "to secure for moral judgments an
objectivity that would free such judgments from the subjective beliefs,
wants and stories of the agent who makes them."16 Part of the explanation for this attempt, of course, is that moral philosophers have been
gripped by a scientific ideal of objectivity and have thus sought to
escape any suggestion of partiality. Unfortunately, says Hauerwas,
this attempt to free reason from the concerns of particular individuals
and communities has obscured the narrative character of our existence,
including the moral aspects of our lives. Indeed, this preoccupation
with the nonnarrative account of rationality has led directly to the
problems listed above, for it has led moral philosophers to concentrate
their attention on only one part of our lives-that concerned with
moral decision making -as if this part were unconnected to the whole.
This, in turn, has resulted in the illusion that our moral experience can
be understood on the basis of rules and principles unconnected to our
interests and life plans. Thus, Hauerwas argues that we must recover a
narrative account of rationality if we are to overcome the problems
besetting modern moral theory.
The significance of all this for our purposes is that, according to
Hauerwas, the problems facing modern moral theory are connected to
problems confronting contemporary Christian ethics. To see the connection we need only attend to Hauerwas's account of the origin of
Christian ethics as a self-conscious activity. In Hauerwas's view, this is
16
and Tragedy(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Stanley Hauerwas, Truthfulness
Press, 1977), p. 16.

331

The Journal

of Religion

a rather recent development, dating roughly from the nineteenth century. Thus, he writes,
The preoccupation with Christian ethics as a, if not the, central enterprise of
Christian theology is primarily a legacy of Protestantliberalism. As the central
Christian beliefs came under increasingly successful philosophical and historical challenges, an emphasis on the moral significance of those beliefs seemed
to offer a strategy to save their meaningfulness. Therefore, Christian ethics, as
a self-conscious endeavor, represented a retrenchment to secure some meaning, if not truth, for religious belief. The moral implications of the doctrines of
God, Jesus, and reconciliation appeared to be the nail on which the continued
viability of Christianity could hang.17
Once again we see highlighted a theme identified by Stout's problematic. For what Hauerwas is suggesting is that one response to the
challenge posed by the flight from authority was to substitute ethics for
theology. This, as we have seen, was the response endorsed by Kant.
But just as Metz rejects this Kantian move, so too does Hauerwas. The
problem with this strategy is that, when combined with a nonnarrative
view of moral rationality, it inevitably leads to a reductionistic account
of religious belief. It does so because the whole point of the standard
account is to arrive at rules and principles that are universally applicable. Thus, any religious belief justified by appeal to the canons of this
account will necessarily be stripped of its distinctiveness. "The 'moral'
kernal," as Hauerwas puts it, will not "seem to require the 'religious'
claims associated with it."18
It will come as no surprise to learn that what Hauerwas suggests
ought to be done here is to abandon the standard account of moral
rationality and to reintroduce the category of narrative as central to
Christian ethics. What may be surprising is to discover what the upshot
of doing so is, namely, an account of Christian ethics that appears
designed to avoid what Stout has identified as the two great contemporary dangers: irrelevance and lack of distinctiveness. And, indeed, this
seems to be what Hauerwas intends. He says, for example, that the
nineteenth-century theologians were right to argue that the truthfulness of Christian convictions "resides in their practical force" but wrong
to think that this meant justifying them by reinterpreting these beliefs
in a way that made them universally acceptable and applicable. In fact,
according to Hauerwas, attention to the narrative character of these
convictions helps one to see that they do not need to be reformulated in
order to be intelligible to the modern world. Thus, in Truthfulnessand
17
Stanley Hauerwas, A Community
of Character
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), p. 89.

18 Ibid.
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Tragedy,he writes, "To emphasize the story character of the gospel... is
a way to remind us of the inherently practical character of theological
convictions. For Christian convictions are not meant to picture the
world. They do not give a primitive metaphysics about how the world
is constituted. Rather the gospel is a story that gives you a way of being
in the world."19 This is why Hauerwas says that his work "implicitly
involves a critique of a great deal of contemporary theology" and, in
particular, that which, "seeks to uncover the meaning of Christian
'symbols' or 'myth."'20 Such a theology attempts to make Christian
beliefs intelligible apart from their practical application, and, yet,
because the meaning of Christian convictions is inseparable from their
practical implications, this is precisely what cannot be done. Any
reductionistic theology is therefore averted.
Moreover, this emphasis on the practical force of narrative also suggests why the refusal to reinterpret the doctrines of the Christian faith
does not lead to a Kierkegaardian irrelevance. It does not because
accepting narrative as a central category of Christian ethics is to
express a "categorial preference for story over explanation as a vehicle
of understanding."21 And, if we are not concerned about explanation,
then we need not worry about "translating" the narratives of Scripture
in a way that would allow them adequately to describe the modern
world. On the contrary, what we will be concerned about is their
ability to change the world, for this, says Hauerwas, is what the biblical
stories were meant to do. Understanding the stories is thus inseparable
from making them our own, and this means allowing these stories to
shape the ways in which we both perceive the world and relate to it.
Thus, for Hauerwas, the Christian stories do have a cognitive dimension, for they provide categories for structuring our existence in the
world. But these categories are not representational; they do not picture the world and are not meant to explain it. Far from ending the
dialogue with the modern, secular world, then, the Christian theologian
is called to show that the stories of the Christian faith continue to offer a
distinctive and truthful way of perceiving and relating to the world.
CORRELATIONS

AND CONCLUSIONS

Thus far, we have seen that the notion of narrative is central to the
work of both Metz and Hauerwas and that in both cases there is a connection between this reliance on narrative and the existence of a certain
19 Hauerwas,

Truthfulnessand Tragedy, p. 73.
Hauerwas, A Community of Character,p. 2.
21
Hauerwas, Truthfulnessand Tragedy, p. 34.

20
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set of problems facing contemporary theology. But how is the work of
each writer correlated to that of the other? This is a question we have
not yet examined directly but which we must take up in this section of
the paper. Since I have argued that their mutual reliance on narrative
is not coincidental but the result of a response to similar concerns, there
ought to be substantial overlap between the two. Noting this overlap
should be a useful way of reinforcing my thesis.
There are, I think, three particularlyimportant areas of intersection
between the work of Metz and that of Hauerwas, all related to a focus
on narrative. The first is an emphasis on the social location of the individual. Both, as we have seen, resist the Enlightenment emphasis on
the rational, autonomous individual who seeks abstraction from the
particularitiesof historical existence. Both Metz's polemic against the
"timelessdecision"of the individual, which he says relegates religion to
the status of an afterthought, and Hauerwas's emphasis on the importance of community, as securing the holism absent in the standard
account of moral rationality, are attempts to recover a view of the self
that is socially, as opposed to individualistically, oriented. And in both
cases, there is a clear connection here to the notion of narrative. We
saw Metz saying, for example, that human consciousness is unavoidably entwined in stories and that man's identity is always shaped by
narrative identification. But Hauerwas is equally clear: "Ourargument
put in traditional terms is that the moral life must be grounded in the
'nature'of man. However, that 'nature'is not 'rationality'itself, but the
necessity of having a narrative to give our life coherence."22For both
men, then, there is an important connection between the category of
narrative and the view of human nature that informs their theological
and ethical position. And whether it is the formerthat leads to the latter
or the latter to the former, the important point is that narrative serves
as a crucial category for both.
The second point of overlap was also implicit in my earlier discussion, and it is this: for both writers there can be no strong distinction
between theory and praxis. This is why for both Metz and Hauerwas
theology cannot be distinguished from ethics as a separate discipline.
Hence Hauerwas'scomment that he is "uneasy"with the description of
his work as "ethics"rather than "theology."Similarly, we find Metz
describing his work as "practicalfundamental theology"to emphasize
that there can be no genuine theology that is not practical. Again, in
both cases, the connection with narrative is present; for both see an
emphasis on narrative as a move away from theory and to practice. As
Hauerwas puts it, "The primary function of narratives by contrast to
22
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explanatory schemes [is] to relate us to the world, including our plans
for modifying it."23 With this, Metz would certainly agree.
We come, then, to what is probably the most significant area of overlap between Metz and Hauerwas; unhappily, it is also the most problematic. It involves their respective accounts of the truthfulness of
Christian convictions, and, in both cases, it is essentially a pragmatist
one. We have seen, for example, that Hauerwas claims that the intelligibility and truthfulness of Christian convictions resides in their practical force and that, according to Metz, the intelligibility of Christianity
cannot be justified theoretically but only practically. It is Hauerwas,
however, who most explicitly states the connection between this
account of truth and the narrative structure of Christian belief. In A
Communityof Character,he writes: "The necessary interrelation of narrative and character provides the means to test the truthfulness of narrative. Significant narratives produce significant and various characters
necessary for the understandings and richness of the story itself. Just as
scientific theories are partially judged by the fruitfulness of the activities they generate, so narratives can and should be judged by the richness of moral character and activity they generate."24 That this is also
Metz's view, there can be little doubt. Indeed, anticipating responses to
his position, Metz himself raises one of the most telling objections to
this account of truth. He writes: "What, in other words, is the position
of truth in a practical fundamental theology? Is truth in this context not
simply made subordinate to praxis? Is truth not re-interpreted as relevance? And does this re-interpretation not simply conceal... what
really happens, namely the liquidation of the concept of truth, insofar
as a truth that is oriented towards praxis is no longer truth?"25Now I do
not think that either Metz or Hauerwas satisfactorily answers this
objection, and although I want to say more about this shortly, for now
the interesting thing to note is that their answers turn out to be so
similar. Indeed, the resemblance is so remarkable that it is worth
setting their answers side by side. The first passage, then, is from
Metz; the second from Hauerwas.
It is only if truth is previously conceived as correlative with pure reason or
theory or as the result of absolute reflection that this objection to practical
fundamental theology and its supposed attitude toward truth can be
sustained.26
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Under the spell of Kantian accounts of rationality, there lingers the fear that if
we recognize the historic nature of our moral convictions we will have to
acknowledge them as arbitrary and possibly even false. But such fear is ill
founded, as there is no other basis of moral convictions than the historic and
narrative-relatedexperience of a community.27
What we can now appreciate is that for both Hauerwas and Metz an
appeal to the category of narrative is an effort to redress the cognitive
crisis highlighted by Stout without abandoning claims to truthfulness.
To the question, Which claims of Christian faith are true in the modern
world? Hauerwas and Metz answer in unison that it is those that generate a significant praxis. To the objection, But this pragmatic theory
of truth is not a solution to the cognitive problems facing Christian
thought but a rejection of them, Hauerwas and Metz again reply in
unison that to believe thus is to accept a moribund epistemology. Once
this mistaken epistemology is abandoned, they argue, pragmatism will
appear unobjectionable.
Yet, I think it can be argued that, even on their own terms, there are
serious questions that can be raised about the adequacy of these respective accounts of truth. For while both Metz and Hauerwas agree about
the narrative structure of Christianity, and while both agree that the
truthfulness of the Christian story is to be measured by its practical
consequences, they disagree dramatically about what those consequences are. Since this is of some importance for assessisng the adequacy of the category of narrative in Christian ethics, I want to spend
the final section of this paper examining how these two very similar
accounts of the role of narrative in Christian thought result in two very
different normative ethical positions.
Once again the initial impression is one of resemblance. Both Metz
and Hauerwas talk about the connection between narrative and a
renewed emphasis on the Christian community, both highlight the
practical implications of the memory of Jesus' death and resurrection,
and both insist that Christian social action involves the imitation of
Christ as revealed in the biblical narratives. Here, however, the resemblance ends, for, if we look more closely at what each says the upshot of
following these prescriptions will be, we may well feel that they are
reading different stories. For Metz, the result is a life committed to near
revolutionary social action; for Hauerwas, a life given to a sort of sectarian pacifistic witness. How then, do we account for this difference?
The best way to answer this question, I think, is to take a look at how
the category of narrative is related to the normative position with which
it is associated. In Metz's case, this means examining the relation
27 Hauerwas, A Community Character 17
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between what he argues are the three basic categories of a practical
fundamental theology: memory, narrative, and solidarity. According
to Metz, solidarity is the central category of Christian praxis and
involves "the idea of the possibility of all men becoming subjects in the
presence of God."28 But this notion, while central, is also vague and
must be given a more determinate sense. And this is where memory
and narrative come in. As Metz puts it at one point, "Memory and narrative only have a practical character when they are considered together
with solidarity and solidarity has no specifically cognitive status without memory and narrative."29 The picture that emerges, then, is that of
Christian praxis being shaped directly by the memory of the life and
death of Jesus made available by the narratives of the Christian faith.
And Metz is quite explicit about what that memory yields; it is, he
says, "a specific memoriapassionis"that is at the same time a memory of
freedom. It is thus a "dangerous memory," and the stories through
which it is mediated are "dangerous stories." They are dangerous
because they introduce the "remembered freedom ofJesus into modern
society" and demand that we make Jesus' allegiance with the oppressed
and rejected our own. The stories, in other words, call for and make
possible solidarity with the oppressed in the form of direct social action
on their behalf. This is why, in A Theologyof the World, Metz characterizes his position as one of "militant eschatology" and says that "the
terminusa quo of the Christian mission should be the secular society."30
For Metz, the biblical narratives relate the story of Jesus and the
promises he made to the oppressed and downtrodden, promises that
the story calls us to honor by working for their fulfillment.
To get a sense of how wide the gap is here between Metz and Hauerwas, we need only look at several representative passages from Hauerwas. They show that, for Hauerwas, the terminus a quo of the Christian mission is not secular society but the Christian community.
For the service that Christians are called upon to provide does not have as its
aim to make the world better, but to demonstrate that Jesus made possible a
new world, a new social order.31
Though this book touches on many issues it is dominated by one concern: to
reassert the social significance of the church as a distinct society with an integrity peculiar to itself. My wish is that this book might help Christians rediscover that their most important social task is nothing less than to be a community capable of hearing the story of God we find in scripture.32
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The problem, it seems, is that there is more than one story to be told,
and Metz and Hauerwas would indeed seem to be telling and listening
to different tales. We can see this by simply contrasting the central
themes of their respective stories. As we have seen, for Metz the predominant theme is that of the promise of freedom and liberation from
the burdens of economic and social inequality; for Hauerwas, however,
the central motif is the notion of life as gift. According to Hauerwas,
this is what the biblical narratives provide, namely, an understanding
of the world as ruled by powers other than violence and death.
"Because,"says Hauerwas, Christians "have the confidence that Jesus'
cross and resurrectionare the final words concerning God's rule,"they
are freed to trust, rather than fear, others, including their oppressors.
It is here, then, that Hauerwas most clearly diverges from Metz. For
while Hauerwas says that "interpretationdoes not preclude action,"he
also says that the first and most important responsibility of the church
is to provide "categoriesof interpretationthat offer the means for us to
understand ourselves truthfully, e.g., we are a sinful yet redeemed
people."33This is why Hauerwas says that the Christian stories do not
offer us a resolution of life difficulties or a strategy for such a resolution. Rather, they offer us a way of understanding ourselves and the
world in terms of which such difficulties are insignificant.
That this could not be further from Metz's view should by now be
clear. Yet what are we to make of this? At the very least, I think it
ought to highlight the concerns I raised about the account of truth that
both Metz and Hauerwas associate with the category of narrative. For
whatever similarities the two exhibit in discussing the importance of
narrative as an epistemological category of Christian thought, when it
comes to recommendations for practical action, the category of narrative by itself appears to play almost no role at all. Indeed, it neither
helps to explain nor to justify the normative position of either Metz or
Hauerwas. It fails to explain their positions because there is no substantive moral position entailed merely by appeal to the category of
narrative. Yet there appears to be no way to argue for this substantive
content since, on the terms set out by Metz and Hauerwas, the only
argument available is one based on the practical consequences themselves, and these will, of course, depend on the substantive content that
we are trying to justify. The fact that Metz and Hauerwas diverge so
sharply when applying the category of narrative normatively signals a
serious problem. For if the truthfulness of the Christian story is to be
judged by its practical consequences, and these consequences are as
varied as Hauerwas and Metz's writings would suggest, how does an
33 Ibid.,
p. 109.
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appeal to narrative establish the truthfulness of Christian convictions,
even on pragmatic grounds?
Both authors appear to assume that, because members of the Christian community share a common story, they will share a common
praxis. But this fails to account for the variety of moral patterns derived
from this story. Indeed, we have seen that the praxis embraced by
Hauerwas is very different from the praxis embraced by Metz. Nor is
this a problem merely for Metz and Hauerwas. It is a problem for
anyone who wants to appeal to the place of narrative in the moral life.
In fact, this divergence between Metz and Hauerwas highlights a
fundamental problem for anyone assigning narrative a central place in
theology and ethics: when we have endorsed a preference for story over
explanation and argument, what do we do when our stories conflict?
Or again: if two interpretations of the same story diverge, how do we
resolve this conflict? The best that Metz and Hauerwas seem to offer in
response is that we should test our stories or our interpretations by their
practical consequences. But for the reasons given above, this test
appears impossible to apply. There is no substantive moral view entailed
merely by appeal to the general category of narrative, and any appeal
to an actual narrative will require interpretation. Thus, the fact that
Metz and Hauerwas diverge so sharply in their respective interpretations of the Christian narrative should leave one less than sanguine
here.
Still, there are limits to the possible interpretations of a story, even a
narrative as rich as the Christian story. For this reason, Hauerwas and
Metz can perhaps claim that an ethic based on the Christian story is
distinctive. I suppose, too, that there is merit to their suggestion that, if
one does not treat Christianity as a primitive metaphysics but as a
story with life-transforming potential, Christianity will remain relevant
in the modern world. But avoiding Stout's dilemma, irrelevance or
indistinctiveness, is not the same as securing truth. We must remember
that this dilemma itself is generated by the apparent improbability of
Christian convictions in the modern world. The root problem, then, is
one of truth. And failing to give an adequate account of the truthfulness of the Christian narratives is every bit as fatal as making Christianity either irrelevant or indistinctive.
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